Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8e53c5b0b85c2fc5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.4 KB Created: 2021-02-13 12:13:40 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: e082be2a5e92ac7cc6a37951ecb8be3b SHA-1: 5e81898006640dab46e29471cf2ceb57ac1289ae SHA-256: 8e53c5b0b85c2fc56854e366ea78d1b49cae814ce399d9ca70829c5ad270f91b
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URIs point towards an attempt to leverage external resources for malicious purposes.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://druttle.ru/aws?utm_term=watercolor+manual+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368962/normal_601c7161be981.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sesumaku/fhNPLqk/7785984166.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4491432/normal_601b7e232c7e0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387430/normal_600ddcecd0d04.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4460966/normal_60069db9108b9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zumovinej/BjQ9idp/gozadebexojutedotoxoteto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366637/normal_601050fd9f50a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4470687/normal_5fc5e43c1a32f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sejimewopokotas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135350214/nuzufe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jeletaru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135321400/mawuxik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426944/normal_60212e11cffa6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kikosizijup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379594/wuxikukagelurumikimu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuxufagitagagi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740521/wirirodazudo-xidulugosofajag-puzirewo-jedufak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jixelaxoli.66ghz.com/lekakuzetazutexuziwot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vodadavubex/bUQjgcv/rupegomoveparosategagi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/taguxif/60571738831.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sisaxu/sufedederexat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rumezo/badshah_movie_songs_mp4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zupenafud/83653912390.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e770.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE770 4180 bytes
SHA-256: c90035d82713250b17e9987d1bcb935211440db8b1f4723df008a5dc8e070eec
font_01_sfnt_off0000f5f9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5F9 5136 bytes
SHA-256: aa64981a25df56db7c90f7c21fd558156eeddead01de9493124b5cdd734a7f0a
font_02_sfnt_off0001076b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1076B 10796 bytes
SHA-256: 6dceee39899f10c21a1fc888d99e2b9c89784cd7e3a51995e5b84c0e6325bd7f

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.