RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 8e48ba3d75f77398

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: 7e0791da75595f97a81f81bc2c75f2dc SHA-1: ccfc173eda98f37050df005ee6882a5bcbe1e42c SHA-256: 8e48ba3d75f77398e0f592450c4174c5699c7f6f6c5b7fa9cb85b39029aa7ecd

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing multiple OLE objects, with high-confidence heuristics indicating that these objects are automatically linked and updated, designed to trigger execution. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a typical social engineering lure to bypass security measures and execute embedded malicious content. No specific scripts were extracted, but the OLE object structure strongly suggests a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `2f647fa0d5380e701cd3340cea5e1e99c045ae0d5064cf423076f61bc7277aa2`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79784 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `102fd18b9d15ae2dd9b2cb3037c126006e5384d9a0629df57d915fcb873b1efa`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79757 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9bb.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9BB	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f5e.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F5E	12297 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.