Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8e33b98b82da9128…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.3 KB Created: 2020-12-06 11:22:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 73bfaf41dfb14124507681489f7cbd78 SHA-1: 9371786ae53f22088b437fbf1ca646f8dcbbec07 SHA-256: 8e33b98b82da9128bfc399534f3e3394e606d6b4ccc0289b42d837d0dcc4c109
224 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that redirect to known malicious infrastructure, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. The presence of a password archive lure suggests an attempt to bypass gateway security by encrypting a payload, which is then likely delivered via the malicious link.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?utm_term=amiga+os+3.+1+4 In PDF document text
    • https://baletepo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776023/7588734.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367940/normal_5f9a047ea2c2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dedibigi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134358563/a45548c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zaxizibu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134672664/dafudetunusowi-vowakisemevi-lerebiri-neluzexot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vukaxibunima.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134885707/venudasitoja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mubuvume.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134885019/nesazegemix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c4b6ce87-0699-4b39-a197-adae13974fbb/leyes_de_mendel_definicion.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/392b1c1d-71eb-4480-b56d-471f92dd0378/sozevonigigudatar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fbce344be7cfc36344e8aaf/t/5fbf4c8818e72e5fdbcdf5bd/1606372492749/ar_15_cleaning_kit_academy.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4ef35db8-79d2-4083-8e82-3127d49b9609/56059225677.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d421890b-cc6d-4a44-9f9a-f5cff67a0543/dijakirixagov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/232ecbb1-afaa-489b-8d6b-99a31c433e0a/real_car_key_party.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1cb88436-495e-4b5e-b9ee-6b86fc07d202/tuvolixesanedupuwopu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d6f7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD6F7 4684 bytes
SHA-256: 5e5739b1dc2a223cd2679cf2314d9d6ca9a41c867c8d5f7b393725cb651bedd2
font_01_sfnt_off0000e6e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6E6 12556 bytes
SHA-256: af3698e28a502352e672d6bf07a2b0fa2fd5c37735307d774ee31bf690f7715b
font_02_sfnt_off00010d6f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10D6F 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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