Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8db8248b5acfb636…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

15.6 KB Created: 2021-08-19 09:28:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 9d2627e6832d48e8eca96287471026fc SHA-1: b97cd36cf8fd79278096fdce88e7c31fc2e201c5 SHA-256: 8db8248b5acfb6360d7c2482a186ec836765e643afbab50666d498140adf6ecd
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is likely a payload or contains a link to one, specifically flagging it as a potential CVE-2026-21514 exploitation attempt. The presence of an executable extension within the OLE package strongly suggests it's designed to drop and auto-execute a secondary malicious file.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
d2b01dbfc91952edc3f000b0571cb229eda403579efabbb52a4ed1b96b5ec251
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 5120 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
d8e8e022ab85f5ab32d308a4df479e2ecc87f2805c28a790e7778eff16143a81
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2864 bytes
emf_00.emf
33098d7110377ae231b4f7350c9b38a9a6bc12de5f9fbb03362ce9af9723ad67
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5340 bytes