Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8db44fb1e0f92ed4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.4 KB Created: 2020-12-29 18:04:14 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7594b8f1735eb5471c90c645f7f1c04f SHA-1: b89826e83f2fd88f27c14d7335090b08117f0489 SHA-256: 8db44fb1e0f92ed4c76144fb237e3e1589be35ad6cba9dee9a56a857ee7f6ef8
174 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as malicious, including a high-confidence ML classifier and ClamAV detection. The heuristics indicate it is a payment redirection lure, attempting to trick users with fake invoice or payment language. The embedded URLs, such as 'https://trafficel.ru/strik?utm_term=all+recharge+bill+payments+cashback+apple+pay', likely lead to phishing sites or further malware. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is indicative of a malicious lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/strik?utm_term=all+recharge+bill+payments+cashback+apple+pay
    • https://rupogasonewu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134653860/b721302077.pdf
    • https://nurigefisigutip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134628418/5cd6eaa74d.pdf
    • https://guvepilafofifiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134682232/tokilato-bogur-rejazotiselezi-dugexavipawipow.pdf
    • https://mudomuroda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134728654/wenufixexe-kujopifipogiw.pdf
    • https://sozivutapadonen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164462/3178586.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vudebalox/aBhdhgJ/dabuwugopod.pdf
    • https://pufetebad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134711346/05d347cd6b.pdf
    • https://xelabuxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235382/temekonabinodog_laxuxadenajad_vasika_ganufajena.pdf
    • https://wobomiti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134501920/regodiruzu_nufadosu_vasuzudisulada.pdf
    • https://bumobuzeki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134477779/negofazok.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/leteraxewe/paxer.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jusagi/streaming_services_tv_guide.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/farezelof/lugatawo.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e424.bin
90d6f9b6ad2f080b5974ac078f805b24593ec2d1d4290463b226cb9166166dd8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE424 5644 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f738.bin
852d66ba6d93018cdbc02b768ff480cbb3f788043692ff18d7ea808808ca3dfa		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF738 11000 bytes

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