Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d9c6d47a06a5c8d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.9 KB First seen: 2022-11-09
MD5: cd0a246514edbaa3122956724871b58d SHA-1: 6e3b24d4449b85868e1a7ec1882b7c5548fd78f5 SHA-256: 8d9c6d47a06a5c8d090f4e73d488f4b23c0d4d108157385840f135f7c2156f00
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, and an \objupdate directive that forces OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers to bypass security settings and trigger exploits.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004f74.bin
f3a9c2935ee54403a46e71a028e2a2ec398da669a786e381fcc59970782acef8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4F74 1752 bytes