Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d97cb1af2d4f226…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

23.4 KB First seen: 2022-11-09
MD5: 52d2b7b5b089b066b4d25d82d6cf0c9f SHA-1: f981fac030afd6b0652decfe40bd9f3938813aaa SHA-256: 8d97cb1af2d4f226c632ba19bdb4275a6bcd7bde14331acdf6e05512634e385f
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would trigger the exploit. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000047b5.bin
609e56ac480ea678e117cf28936dbb9442ff122b9b37a47ba4d9776fd3915c94
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x47B5 1543 bytes