Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d7dcebd92397830…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

43.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-02
MD5: d8fc1c6e52286071cbf5d9368e73ab06 SHA-1: 4bfdb3cde8b55fea65af8b79f6e1bb7fd2823d44 SHA-256: 8d7dcebd923978300d0422b18460f65b573299a2d2add70b0e26dabe3605e1bc
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a password-encrypted OOXML file identified as an exploit carrier for CVE-2017-0199. It contains an embedded URL that acts as a remote loader, designed to download and execute a secondary malicious document. The encrypted nature of the document prevents direct content analysis, but the exploit and URL are clear indicators of a malicious delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://wwwarglobalincinte.sytes.net/swiss/trn17/trn17.docx?&publisher=hushed&train=tearful&airship=wry&job=flipped-out&mirror

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