Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d4f562faf53456d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.19 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-15
MD5: fdcab49010fcc5d49e3c0bac441425eb SHA-1: 785b7624c9e5aa29dd01f625a95ca0e02195cf0e SHA-256: 8d4f562faf53456df4b0ffeb121533af5c0e48f22e610ca9f10eeaf264d6035f
134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE object attempts to load a remote resource from the URL http://192.3.179.157/IG/00000000000o0o0o0o0O0O0O0O000o0o0o00000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000O0O.DOC. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads. The embedded PDF also shows suspicious static findings, suggesting it may be part of a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.3.179.157/IG/00000000000o0o0o0o0O0O0O0O000o0o0o00000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000O0O.DOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00045000.pdf
d5d8b1a18f1b2d60ed6892c2d1e6c5516207f554c4b870df217be1808539f749		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x45000 962048 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
f4119b381ea6b12705228da3157669306d81ce65c8993752668fef1ec1715812		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 1241088 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
2caa53aed729e3704a6da3d18bf47e531074c6d481c1db04648c5156b40def0e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1219584 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00091400.pdf
eb1b69be75274832cb9d56d866a6d388db75c60d2094b35232fb8988db7e8083		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x91400 649728 bytes

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