Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d2dd9c5a068200e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.17 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-21
MD5: ab452473dc0eb03bd92efe0fb5514a0c SHA-1: 456d11dd9f6c50b782ae3472f8b76f752fc5b4d9 SHA-256: 8d2dd9c5a068200e26b6f8000a0893eb3823699f7d510290a8a12ca540fc6d0f
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object is designed to deliver a secondary PDF payload, which in turn contains a direct link to an executable or archive. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, indicating they are not the primary infection vector. The embedded PDF also exhibits suspicious static findings and parser evasion techniques.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • https://mobile.mail.yahoo.com/apps/affiliateRouter?brandUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fparg.co/UZzB&appName=YMailNorrin&partner=2&locale=1&pageId=&clickRef=contact_card&region=na&annotation=&buckets=

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
b363fe551a3a05445b341e0cd962e08636f4478bb3b0c6833c3ac5a18e1d9e50		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00310FFF/OlE10nATiVE 1233 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
5cca13f385c5a9b9f829da9db6db56cdd21c82d4fc973e8888c0165dcbed8eca		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1218048 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
ba24cb5ad675a5eda178d84013674914cc073a4bc8d2de911882579c454e3b53		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1197056 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e400.pdf
11502a1ff5dacc71e6199bd538b4b25aea40719ab0e233e9ce1468c38a2be534		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE400 1164288 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001dc00.pdf
33d11fd4c8c9bceca148a9cd9db3c4785595ec16f864ba62e5f87970dbf9ad9f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1DC00 1100800 bytes

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