Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d1f45d91db28039…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.8 KB Created: 2020-12-26 00:03:54 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: bf5802e5bf2221dfec9d94e10fde1e92 SHA-1: 1933003bd0d27070f30eb9893201b1fcd2a6aac8 SHA-256: 8d1f45d91db280392b07a2eab236ba1a03f3158dd69b5dabe1434956e13abc92
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains numerous embedded links, many of which point to known malicious redirectors or disposable hosting services. The primary heuristic firings indicate it functions as a link farm designed to direct users to potentially harmful content. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the assessment of its malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?utm_term=amazon+stock+symbol In PDF document text
    • https://wigewowatabosaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352056/kumegabutetod_bomamilifumimup_tikojij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://supavutoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134713891/cf70531e4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuwapelenepaje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134705438/kexuxanoweboga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lipojiwogim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776075/940c73227c544da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/desiruzag/1die1jb/xaguraruzulesit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lagukekejase.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130815031/rebiburasonive_kokijifa_sasuxamu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://voberugupov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134496708/tesimuwezukoradekaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bubixoduxufito.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070588/motojewakax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d26e14f6-247e-4c94-9902-28914b461b95/77644992986.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3678f022-c386-4df7-9abc-eb5d04749195/74331323415.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d061af69-b0a1-463a-84a8-9b5c8ff4b2e4/sofazigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d92e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD92E 4816 bytes
SHA-256: c27358d7225221a6095a6aae1a7d6495f5318ec513dc5280f59e3ef4471c5368
font_01_sfnt_off0000e97a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE97A 11572 bytes
SHA-256: de8c4f04247e92d82f41a2efc57ed754bfe0172b67fef67d4f3e89bf355fa852
font_02_sfnt_off000110d0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x110D0 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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