Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d07b967b0bfdc44…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.21 MB
MD5: 3d5d468278a53417b489b8af898dc0e9 SHA-1: 43b57296a28efb3045c08e9bd3cef73b8bb04e44 SHA-256: 8d07b967b0bfdc447446bf686a64ed7cbcab79872a0178a87047f81c6a696ff9
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections, along with the critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, strongly indicates exploitation of this known vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
8f86abe1e690474cb6b5e4a14cd9cf9f5e5856962d1fdb748d9d264e439b2233
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27208 bytes
objdata_01_off0001ca51.bin
1a9daf7f5259077ae9a7fba5e35fb7f5d70b6d43574b5a4ed8dc4e9c9ad184d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CA51 475057 bytes