Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8d074ac47a34bfab…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.0 KB
MD5: 9e3aad42b457e9fbf3c04abc393a7d31 SHA-1: b1b0236604533a772fd24ec0828abd10ba959f7a SHA-256: 8d074ac47a34bfab2cc88ae1174bfec359d96c40d5da7388bc7c9e3deed9f51d
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF document that leverages the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability, which is an exploit targeting Adobe Reader's LibTIFF component. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution. The PDF contains an XFA form with executable script, indicating an attempt to deliver a malicious payload. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploit method is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
be1b6bf3f81b4758e5e155f7b2250549ab311f34c2959f9db4550ec96e0ee968		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101604 bytes

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