Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8cabd5d72dd62467…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.1 KB Created: 2021-01-21 12:23:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 23f761eeb31e4ee54f562a3d8d5cc447 SHA-1: 98606bed0bccfb7e2ad4bb5cde9a550b2f147a4e SHA-256: 8cabd5d72dd62467be37763927b3cc991d534e01c286a1c0c96b4e7f366f26a7
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics, including ML classification and ClamAV, indicating malicious intent. The document body contains instructions that lure the user into executing a command using 'cmd.gotorecord acform', likely to download and execute a second-stage payload from the embedded URL. The presence of external links and the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic further support this attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?utm_term=docmd.+gotorecord+acform+%25E3%2582%25B5%25E3%2583%2596%25E3%2583%2595%25E3%2582%25A9%25E3%2583%25BC%25E3%2583%25A0 PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pixazizaze/1jeNZMN/coleco_mini_arcade_donkey_kong_jr.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dekaroku/UzGiec1/97285854213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wopopodixela.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969383/tanidawifeki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/disumuneriva/7haF0J6/break_up_facebook_page.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sevalaturi/eTUifgh/nerurosubarutavibenawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bizufunido/hjMFhdA/16774933011.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jevipugirofi/fFja8ih/lusura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziresaro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134509830/disozibesitopaz_zesevomufejopu_duzisobepowo_bimimumomuten.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/senosekagoko/bUeo0jd/83505553680.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/limewub/function_combo_box_google_sheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tuzamada/animoto_video_app.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/feliso/6553153143.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/desekusoxi/bibliographic_information_apa_format.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zakunafu/8283499399.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/votubukaxogilix/5555525344.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xezonijida/free_ebook_template_for_openoffice.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/boxujetanonikuv/52419289613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc55.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC55 3340 bytes
SHA-256: 79a9608c4295e0ad07453942e8c0a91716f5a24f70c8bcaef50db1b5d477a58b
font_01_sfnt_off0000e81e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE81E 3888 bytes
SHA-256: 89bd253089f0721a83c90dd50d97bc4113f0145c23bb1350b1b136cf31edc0d3
font_02_sfnt_off0000f5d4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5D4 5164 bytes
SHA-256: bdeb489a8608cfaf537d5f51283b0e915edde674193a11cee82c0dce7178d831
font_03_sfnt_off00010759.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10759 10900 bytes
SHA-256: d96def98f611b7ad52e582a89d84fcec04356cb8d956e0a3e4ff973c1cb9a7ee

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