Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ca7ecb99d31669e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.29 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 661faa0b31507ce5b783bc3a9cd9bfca SHA-1: 620bf62a093df35a663fd050bd80b16309fa62c9 SHA-256: 8ca7ecb99d31669ee4aa94b1a0c8561fcee0efd120c1cd4b51198cd9352084ff
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The file is an RTF document containing embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics for RTF Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759. This indicates the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor to achieve code execution. The presence of an embedded URL, though benign, is noted. No scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is the primary mechanism for malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0014074e.bin
663748bdb20e04105ca2ae869e939d3583516ea5a7e63578c18ac60d52af8edb
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14074E 3739 bytes