Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c9a61922bef2402…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

23.5 KB
MD5: 6b0876ed9d7bd9b7aa4b5aa6d0dbc3dc SHA-1: 421a074a0669ebf833aba1d3f735d2ea3df19e30 SHA-256: 8c9a61922bef2402890068f4d8cf0a2204f071d2585e2a08f331cf84749cafbe
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability through a crafted Equation Editor object. This exploit allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of `eqUatiON.3` as the Equation Editor class further confirms the exploitation vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000117a.bin
a92212cde5353bc35a8c16f25a62f0eb36b6a9ad78596373be668c2c1c2cb791
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x117A 1831 bytes