Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c934133cdad5b29…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.5 KB Created: 2021-04-06 06:57:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4fb9aac79a7051d8abbb8a1a3407f658 SHA-1: d3cd85a5c29d182d8ed84d62bd8ca4488efefa42 SHA-256: 8c934133cdad5b2982cabece79208e76e01d69950ece5d43d2fd81b426b700e5
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, exhibiting characteristics of a link farm. It contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting an attempt to redirect users to potentially malicious content. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to be a lure related to 'piano sheet music', which is a common tactic for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://nipisod.ru/123?utm_term=everytime+we+touch+piano+sheet
    • http://regvoolkim.website/gezironuriwagubugixanavel5qvy.pdf
    • https://momiweporav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134745900/wiluritokotesu.pdf
    • https://tupetemen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738754/cf7d673.pdf
    • https://dubekanenek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997540/90422.pdf
    • https://wunovolal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135311751/3310954.pdf
    • https://dopilefuma.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134733068/5871877.pdf
    • https://posodukur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134347560/fixepatej-pibojefukit-kupeneti.pdf
    • http://ewop.space/nibojevirrna.pdf
    • https://mijisurux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070147/noloveleri-diworitokumasu-ligenodubavan.pdf
    • http://opencabinets.xyz/20990604820c19i4.pdf
    • https://werukubafufu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134000234/dasif_kiwononosasapu_sudipulupamitev.pdf
    • http://begdas.fun/affuteur_remouleur_ambulantfoqun.pdf
    • https://wexabegolorumad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134351445/nalenar_wolikup.pdf
    • https://refapezi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134904673/vutevuvodebi.pdf
    • https://waxovidimised.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134446407/99b21c5b9a9.pdf
    • http://doxulim.iblogger.org/burger_king_application_form_uk.pdf
    • http://xudisoda.66ghz.com/58160048252.pdf
    • http://paselon.getenjoyment.net/how_do_i_remove_demo_mode_sony_bravia.pdf
    • https://dipidedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815933/kowotu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://zaxigadanu.rf.gd/before_i_go_to_sleep_online.pdf
    • http://tifijawubizomed.epizy.com/13162464231.pdf
    • http://rawigukegopafot.onlinewebshop.net/business_plan_application_mobile.pdf
    • http://rowuvasifa.epizy.com/replacement_parts_for_rug_doctor.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e7b9.bin
30163fa65012ed013b5bb7c8e0d8dce3f2d4f2f68a176232b74ae9cffd30102f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7B9 5352 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f9e2.bin
4efdac696d52cb4d5e20a468e82d2da5ea6e2983d40763bed82416f73dcbc18a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9E2 11552 bytes