Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c86c5ae8f781c93…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.4 KB Created: 2021-01-30 22:36:06 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 2beceffe3a81d90716c3064c9ad2ea23 SHA-1: c151ae0410cea99db40411c79f7476915374f55a SHA-256: 8c86c5ae8f781c93b87398075a0aee97563acdbee73f1ca9931fbb8227654cb0
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable domains or known malicious redirectors. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. The document's structure suggests it's designed to overwhelm the user with links, obscuring the malicious ones.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/123?utm_term=starcraft+2+hotkeys+zerg+tips In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/benibavagoge/oxjcujb/29599438837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nuwalimo/aBBgggJ/emergency_dental_care_near_me_on_sunday.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xixilizuxuwogag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134879277/439d72.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gelivebun.22web.org/nazamimu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wuxobilan/ghZihjj/wazipabuwuwuperifixegor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fuvetozexogix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874326/24746dc58bbad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mizabago.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/2/135299272/480281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bofinaposo.iblogger.org/google_play_store_android_5._1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wefexubi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712326/fokuwumut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nubipudovolena.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012318/garolofo_xovotogepo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xadigepuve.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454317/f336e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wotigutaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134361511/kebafezuginedos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4488090/normal_5fcdd04c06c15.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kulobibab/egh7lbH/miminewemamejorosudokud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://lumawasisoxo.rf.gd/gabimufe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lokemuwebofeg.rf.gd/suranegunuzoves.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d299.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD299 5376 bytes
SHA-256: 259d0984432053eb264c3b324fb58c0d1fffb8d2545681af0e0c812f9ed3c249
font_01_sfnt_off0000e501.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE501 11084 bytes
SHA-256: ea06f20311e30099692f09fef800af14996fd550ccb50aca71a3f6d2ad38bf28
font_02_sfnt_off00010ab1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB1 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3

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