Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c852d3e1b07794d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

279.2 KB First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 36678665344917fda56be947f77990a6 SHA-1: 4c8c07ad1a48b909ef4834ab1ea3054f99815b22 SHA-256: 8c852d3e1b07794dad84e8ccdbafafe77811afe092c185ae9197d7069893b8a2
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor CLSID, indicating an exploit targeting this component. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be automatically activated, leading to code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a7.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA7 90860 bytes
SHA-256: d669dd28f8243f77d4a7cc684e3edb08c72c2fdce6f369613720b300cee0e59b