Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c70bfe95c890925…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

212.1 KB Created: 2020-03-24 10:37:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: bb1f29916d4c7ccc1e4931e309087017 SHA-1: 36521883685512b5fc5138fe6e82f940142ea0bf SHA-256: 8c70bfe95c8909258e32a38ab754ca9eac9fc144e315f30592ea9b6d9f6638c7
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is a DOCX document containing VBA macros, specifically triggering an Auto_Close macro and a GetObject call. ClamAV detections indicate it is a dropper. The presence of VBA macros and the ClamAV signature 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-7660653-0' strongly suggest the document's purpose is to download and execute a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7660653-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7660653-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ab79b9b3ae0792165d98e81720e2aadefbd1855f82266a95620bda1df5bab4dc		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 147420 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 12 Chr/ChrW string-construction calls.
vbaProject_00.bin
6ea9a5f2e6c50d352067ebc74afe168c7977040f79d955ca6087daa1f1856e8c		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 300032 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7660653-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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