RTF malware analysis — malicious · 8c6dd3118410a304

MALICIOUS

RTF

29.5 KB First seen: 2022-11-22

MD5: ead49e521b86523da33c7bf917da6c87 SHA-1: 7da793f5851092513f313567738b4666a49c305d SHA-256: 8c6dd3118410a30497d0d326014054deb3a977d96d7c40c5cc62ec1ae218ac97

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common technique for malware droppers to bypass macro security. The primary IOC is the file's SHA256 hash.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000055a7.bin` `268998ce71e2ecebfcc68161156a9b8068c1684fa0b22ee32231049d69d4bb4a`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x55A7	1807 bytes

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