Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c66a4907f06db1e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.8 KB
MD5: 9e91756f0659f0695d91b513103c34cc SHA-1: 0ed6123eb2ac409637227e85d0aa12157fe328b6 SHA-256: 8c66a4907f06db1e030df0adae001156210a75e43f463c71f3b038ea9809b0c4
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious PDF T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms and LibTIFF processing. This exploit likely leads to the execution of a malicious payload. The presence of embedded script markers and XFA forms with executable scripts further supports this. No specific malware family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with a PDF-based exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
d5f2f3df56f7715d5241c2117cace1c2ab4c5e47f4ab5e481cc5e701ef113514		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101399 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.