Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c4f6f20ee8c71c3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

32.5 KB
MD5: fa5c00c836499b6459739b78b5e06322 SHA-1: a1c2523835b1d6785fc87077e354ae0df265a404 SHA-256: 8c4f6f20ee8c71c3cff767f71060cb3e857320fb531e45a79ade97864d62c03b
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password, a common technique to evade static analysis and hide malicious content. Heuristics indicate it functions as an exploit carrier, specifically by containing an embedded OLE object. This suggests the document is designed to exploit vulnerabilities or deliver a secondary payload when opened.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.