Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c3baf6f6e6caf59…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.85 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 098a9686a55db601f16b504c21e4c031 SHA-1: 3e13cb5f1d2a6c681792f4b73e57aefb7c375056 SHA-256: 8c3baf6f6e6caf59d1b2be669afd58f7b67feaf282c91ee3ff2d6aee5f6a17d3
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability related to MSXML SAX OLE activation. The presence of ".objupdate" suggests the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to code execution. The embedded URL, while benign, is associated with the document structure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001c27d9.bin
83e312d26d2402117eda4a7e17ca28bbae74a0cc2b53fd12cca5dbe39ad0db08		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C27D9 3732 bytes

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