Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c0e5bab193275f0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

97.6 KB Created: 2006-04-29 01:29:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 9e9ba2391b8860030988251fc3d480e1 SHA-1: c8f86b9bc899fbb3a5ef5ad52d8bb7f6a6643814 SHA-256: 8c0e5bab193275f02c20ac98e149096de8443a166f9d7558320991522caa6758
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits characteristics of a dropper, with a high number of NOP sleds and references to process creation and memory allocation APIs. Although VBA macros could not be extracted, the presence of these indicators strongly suggests the file is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection as Win.Dropper.Agent-34370 further supports this assessment.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Agent-34370 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Dropper.Agent-34370
  • NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED
    Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 99,938 bytes but its declared streams total only 26,783 bytes — 73,155 bytes (73%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.