Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8c07015c98ec9949…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.2 KB First seen: 2019-09-30
MD5: e5eedd3ea0def63d52e914333dca815e SHA-1: f09b5e1569b204eea1768e0ebabd693473fa129b SHA-256: 8c07015c98ec99493424994b5cca09cde9d4d80a6c2f97f970ef3c17858b3e35
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics for CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, likely as part of a spearphishing attachment campaign. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was truncated, limiting further analysis of the payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000032.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x32 4137 bytes
SHA-256: ed00966f59514a378a4db97f4a1d4e246c8fbf37b6f86fbf71c4f7f55ae49d92