Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8bbb76679e8a2f7d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.3 KB Created: 2020-08-11 13:42:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 87c061a79d272782c0136cec2c54b57e SHA-1: 7b50549dff20dae7b8dfb0e20cbc6f28cc5486ce SHA-256: 8bbb76679e8a2f7d5eee8b171430385c360fa8fc381652191765d7efdfcef650
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to external PDF files hosted on various domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning attempt. One of the primary links, 'https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=brisbane+map+pdf', is identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same URL and references 'Brisbane map pdf', indicating a lure to direct users to malicious infrastructure. The file was generated using wkhtmltopdf, a tool often abused for creating malicious documents.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=brisbane+map+pdf
    • http://libosano.yourtattoostory.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874631/b4d3ce6d3b2.pdf
    • http://files.elisabethmartorell.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695887/pusezaxelu-mikobuma-nagowiwuwarab.pdf
    • http://files.neilestrickgallery.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681415/3356331.pdf
    • http://lefenis.langtechfun.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776485/zamalilojurix.pdf
    • http://files.santabarbaraflyers.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776394/puxuv.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9517/8902/files/20522950603.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8760/9497/files/16115928922.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9923/5228/files/netasifitu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/80787326618.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4717/4812/files/25923759597.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2476/9436/files/xalumufumatosim.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8198/0321/files/moment_of_inertia_of_a_cube.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8909/9938/files/lizuwivadawugeguxa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9672/7962/files/2285192684.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9540/0356/files/jefalipip.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5381/7762/files/xifukefepalelova.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7505/2454/files/juxotalativasokokug.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005478.bin
900de0ee1d9c60961ec7141038784f9d0214b07d7d01c98007cf5c862c1c95ca
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5478 5344 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000667d.bin
4731ee62232313563a8ba2ec41d58cee579fe8afc3394398d39eda2509d6d6bc
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x667D 9976 bytes