Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8b96aef3600697f9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

382.2 KB Created: 2010-03-30 17:26:02 Authoring application: Windows Installer XML (3.0.5419.0)
MD5: 40cd765c69ec60012bf6b4213aa35d76 SHA-1: 8c1fe03096e612864e3300531430655316aac51a SHA-256: 8b96aef3600697f94165242dc424cd98d12a68911a959021b161ba9c8500ca1f
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The OLE file exhibits anomalies in its structure, including a large slack space and an appended payload, strongly indicating malicious intent. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of an appended executable payload suggests the document is designed to drop and execute a secondary stage. The file's SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 391,419 bytes but its declared streams total only 41,143 bytes — 350,276 bytes (89%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0
    • http://office.microsoft.com
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0

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