Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8b51ada0feb7b66b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.32 MB
MD5: 2f195605e93fe714053bb55619d8e1a5 SHA-1: ba687a34e066c8387d7fa4faf702f36731490298 SHA-256: 8b51ada0feb7b66b0424f8cc1e1931320cb9847fceba7eefb8a698f015ed7b4d
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file identified as an exploit carrier. It contains an Equation Editor OLE object, a known technique for embedding and executing malicious code. The encryption with a default password further suggests malicious intent. Without a document body or scripts, the exact payload and delivery mechanism remain unknown, but the presence of the Equation Editor OLE object strongly indicates an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities or deliver malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.