Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8b01aa62a3b8ee34…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

3.28 MB Created: 2022-09-09 13:53:01 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2022-09-11
MD5: 92f461daa7e4133a201fc69a1d3479a5 SHA-1: 6008dfba2ca8d4c292c8cb9d1d45833a68bd2b6d SHA-256: 8b01aa62a3b8ee347dfd39eaed1a8828280569105b703dd3f5b1f133bbea954b
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1218.011 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

The OOXML file contains VBA macros, indicated by the 'OOXML_VBA' heuristic. The 'OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME' heuristic and the presence of obfuscated API calls in the VBA script suggest the macro is designed to execute arbitrary code. The script attempts to load libraries and call functions, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload, but the exact mechanism is obscured.

Heuristics 3

  • OOXML part with non-standard content type and high-entropy data high OOXML_BOGUS_CUSTOM_PART
    The package declares a part with an invented content type (not an OpenXML/Office/standard media type) holding large, high-entropy (likely encrypted/packed) data. Legitimate OOXML files do not carry opaque binary blobs under custom content types; this is the embedded next-stage payload pattern used by loaders such as SVCReady.
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
de3afa80c35f0ba17562b9753e42e7dd2677847103fa19bf451bd607b8576627
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 14011 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
7e21e401643d7a8fb098970e58785c102b859c314ac4978d924d263b1cf6d96e
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 58880 bytes