Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8af4087e61dc1e0c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.5 KB Created: 2020-10-18 18:31:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 49e1941c18011a86d0027dc8dd4e0841 SHA-1: 95c44589ec7fcc985c08cf83a2997083a9df15b8 SHA-256: 8af4087e61dc1e0c99f00e778d34c05e1e72835196ffa157f48b8831930a6f20
232 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a lure for remote support tools, specifically mentioning AnyDesk, and includes a link to a known malicious redirector. The document body and embedded URLs suggest an attempt to trick the user into downloading or interacting with potentially malicious software. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=anydesk+windows+to+android In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369322/normal_5f8c28d4ddf15.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376098/normal_5f8c5cb8882c2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374852/normal_5f8925b7b9214.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366045/normal_5f8706ad0dc71.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sifizebutu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814914/mutorojaku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mamunazeve.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814121/2ff016290be8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rozazokosu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813972/ralexuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rogidalot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636841/junukijidofonegitate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kidunaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437100/gufegudipejabeko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kilejotiwig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406519/dekilowojudu-kubutamozeg-sepomozikom-xanejif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sanuvexugivi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606490/5683404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e16a568f-79b9-4f60-aacc-ce0d5a71d7bb/fisizabepifowalozaniteg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5f6cc166-873f-4e5e-bd0c-d7d7253a8987/kujojixeduz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/eaf1ef98-ce75-4bfb-873e-db88689bfea1/13125485216.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ef1d2987-580d-4470-9630-b3f83dd861e3/50499319550.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0493/0925/3791/files/sazakati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/8233/7444/files/vistas_leccion_13_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/4349/9413/files/what_is_an_investigative_question_in_science.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5526e122-59a2-4e7b-8d48-f0e9788db8d6/wukedeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5313e6c3-cd03-4911-8acc-1823ec34d8d0/22956025456.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/463e074f-ca15-4bb9-bec2-714a918759bd/53233444586.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000068e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x68E6 5032 bytes
SHA-256: 6f35a857751f2e30e0b73844adb5d47ceaaa726e0eee2f20a05f05d9b711be85
font_01_sfnt_off00007a2e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A2E 10032 bytes
SHA-256: c236900bcaf4b4bab4fd8158ca2c7c1c5a5a87ca04663d46bffc02ef325ea171