Hancitor — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ae01fb68107df5b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

949.5 KB Created: 2021-03-02 11:19:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: aed05ff84c598163df82c80162a6a464 SHA-1: 3f8e642f1d19a37fc82b2f720e6531c24cd30571 SHA-256: 8ae01fb68107df5bae3e15d9baa7fdbc50b124da050d1f5323150f2e0d257ffa
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

This OOXML document contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro that utilizes Shell() and CreateObject() calls. It is also flagged for a potential CVE-2026-21514 exploit due to an embedded OLE object with executable indicators. ClamAV detections identify it as Hancitor and Jrat, suggesting it acts as a dropper or downloader for further malicious payloads. The embedded VBA macros are likely responsible for executing the payload.

Heuristics 10

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6b6cfce10fb1a12d5a26326a5fa957bbacfbc9e87da05141a3ab4e9e39535832		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4525 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
99b3a480df24d56d2544eb496a89acf9313c5a00e4a99861fa37c63a9cd9c5b6		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 529920 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
bf81cc592379983a4ecb766b5096cda91103111a4bb6e384048ca4561adb590f		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 517453 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
317754569981ea33d6b8a715b3f04e4945d212877278e93d576f68afe70d7358		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 36864 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
emf_00.emf
bc59ba1cbf4830c8ca32191a6d340a57bf80b07d6bc373a6f22056640709b969		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5000 bytes

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