Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ad15677accca9fb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.6 KB Created: 2021-06-12 10:40:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a7c49241c89f5ed93ecaaa5ae5f316b4 SHA-1: 68de376156069b1a26b342a3fa124d11a477a09e SHA-256: 8ad15677accca9fba7fb8e48b2e9fce2d0a1853c6899bed0300a73966e197b7b
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm heuristic suggest it may leverage embedded JavaScript to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://laborke.ru/pbw?utm_term=lirik+lagu+the+prayer+english+version
    • https://tipiridevozono.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134349557/84c8696e24.pdf
    • https://zoseduzarososu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740870/223451.pdf
    • https://jagedebake.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738918/jebojemotevutiwe.pdf
    • https://sutenemumam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135323571/6581715.pdf
    • https://vawanateriti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969814/gakuraralajezosi.pdf
    • https://siregudak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738759/bimumun.pdf
    • https://katifakemu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381151/javutivawipipi.pdf
    • https://tuvepovuno.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997374/texavejusubi.pdf
    • https://xugugizebe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482894/7481450.pdf
    • https://vajawopi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134597817/7bb9d6af4665e4.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6a2182a4-4545-4941-bce2-42e972c6d443/69521241255.pdf
    • http://favixose.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144829185/how_do_you_reset_a_hot_water_heater_after_a_power_outage.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1718ed4b-b755-4501-9975-85dba0bc2028/mubalizezifufugolu.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9e00b972-6dae-47a6-a55e-2a8fa7f5e292/xuxelamewo.pdf
    • http://wijozuzapusa.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144436719/tezorunesawijex.pdf
    • http://sovafiben.pbworks.com/f/fabiwigakonekamir.pdf
    • http://tusawijer.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144748980/how_to_size_surefire_ear_plugs.pdf
    • http://vibasuvezuz.pbworks.com/f/html_to_with_phantomjs.pdf
    • http://foxubomo.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/145180764/bilinabujigadurumoboxilir.pdf
    • http://xalomuzavege.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144458184/fasigu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c987.bin
e897ddc106f9277a5fed55ad27f0879675eb020605b2a1b5ca8dedbcd514b1e9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC987 5248 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000db6d.bin
09f4992cabd0fc3b45e25cd4ce6eba03a4d86248e2fc4081c24188ca315c050e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB6D 10292 bytes