Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8acf32cc209fe4a6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.0 KB Created: 2021-07-06 07:24:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: b5f51d63801d1428966dddf431433378 SHA-1: be881f2e4ddd38366342a10f9e2ef2f715623bdb SHA-256: 8acf32cc209fe4a668e20feb846b9bc3727ca9b813a68e62201ce94357bbb6be
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains numerous links to disposable hosting sites and compromised CMS uploads, indicative of a link farm used for phishing or malware distribution. The presence of a 'Password-protected archive handoff' heuristic suggests the document is designed to trick users into believing they need a password to access an archive, likely containing a malicious payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature. No scripts were extracted, but the overall structure points to a phishing or malware delivery attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+install+ipa+on+iphone+ios+14 PDF link annotation
    • http://aven.su/userfiles/file/34769718466.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studioguagnoni.it/userfiles/files/mifewo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://daiichilogistics.com/uploads/news_file/nuwogosisuro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16087992dd6bd1---15917364126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lamaisonducoeur.ca/upload/editor/file/vurawiga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hnc2.com/userfiles/file/14006643712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.moteco.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c710d79af7f---kadegux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://costabravas.com/uploads/localidades/files/pigukaluno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ibiza-ferien.de/file/98632120749.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fentesmakina.com/paket/upload/files/80283274582.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asu.com.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/14q9nanffh7b5uqcqesqik0uu9/56733315507.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://softwarefactory.nl/images/file/34393995145.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sam-global.info/files/file/94838646921.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.empresasdelimpeza.info/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c5698e37d9---56717606580.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.rockandroll.blog.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h799979vdunqpr1lc96heo593q/4941795704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://amwordpress.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b33c7665de6---34143432731.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://petroblend.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090afe454f12---wedogoduvenoxoze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.segurosfacility.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607056ed23a9b---tagaxezubobuvalivuzozefim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aimhc.com/userfiles/file/9306938262.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stavclearing.ru/upload/files/gineliduforaziloloxixu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://adbetelparaguay.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1f01ed5e9d3483788f3438f9021e1129/68595271169.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://szao-spb.ru/images/news/file/44464593147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.linkkorea.co.kr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac3dec1a369---86856778684.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea75.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA75 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00010287.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10287 17712 bytes
SHA-256: 2a4d3294ea3bbde02ad8f88329c8a2012f62187fa40358bb19a8b9177efaf345
font_02_sfnt_off0001316f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1316F 10456 bytes
SHA-256: 98b4dceb05ceca2260bde6cbb2da690a4d902b87657d2a77fe46927c3b2cdf00

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