Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8ac7867c6f9f056f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.4 KB Created: 2021-09-06 17:31:22 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 26596d57c8f8054551ca7a22161147a5 SHA-1: 87a3d6bded9617a3353ad5589f614f5507e64194 SHA-256: 8ac7867c6f9f056fc4f5f6fdb8cfefe015f8fc937abf3ee7e80db23078c4cc97
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to compromised websites or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm for phishing or malware distribution. Heuristics indicate the document instructs users to enable macros or editing, a common lure for malware droppers. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or a trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pistant.ru/uplcv?utm_term=microsoft+excel+2019+vba+and+macros+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://huile-de-nigelle.info/userfiles/file/webepufetekikova.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://izharfoster.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161064588d678d---42996004049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://constantcontinuity.com/membership/data//files/51074781933.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hungryalex.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/adbcc4f36f339a05c211f3747415ffb7/74573477123.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://photographerin.agency/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tifpedgfgnjsl0qchqsicvgbm4/babededevetamedofunemera.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lawpropertyconsultants.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/mtqbj2orsppjl4jcpfngk97c2k/21690816718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.scmsgroup.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/medokimu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dabien.co.kr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b6e62e5bdd4---94794951435.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://domgr11.ru/uploads/files/90444257775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--rssx31a7tec6p.com/upload/userfiles/files/20210803051104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.dekleinewerf.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16100eba2dd9e8---98725240053.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.rogierstoel.nl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0b2c7sm34dv6lsn0jhunl60gcn/xixapenisatulofiwaku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mystruggle.uk/indigo/ckfinder/userfiles/files/86929032506.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ceadersvalet.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16133ec7a72b15---sizipoboraleg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kadinlarsitesi.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a38e1cd688d---64915391463.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://home18.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6c7714cb14bb8225bbb782a38cc3e20c/reniroluwekun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alliusie.com/userfiles/file/navebogevegudarufagalenel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ville-dammarie.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xuwaketebagudakujekedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.elektrobetrieb-scholz.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160971f66aa7c3---76187176764.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://partner-support.net/user_data/userfiles/files/jamudojukumubefozoxufe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thumpamonpally.com/userfiles/file/70801457240.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://poketomecam.com/uploads/files/30996946797.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rockhousemethod.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/36878790123.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f27a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF27A 11544 bytes
SHA-256: 84e3642e328296ce0765b87af22069750b6b058ad60edb8e89de24bc8145c3a7
font_01_sfnt_off00010dc1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10DC1 21068 bytes
SHA-256: df6268a6a12447f8a7f6466187c0d31a61a6c5aa7b6fe72939b4d017aebcce60
font_02_sfnt_off000143c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x143C3 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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