RTF malware analysis — malicious · 8a73fd0694a71dc6

MALICIOUS

RTF

14.2 KB

MD5: 0b1e7e8f5df88aab779c84f38e6db605 SHA-1: 61ba0ee13a66bd35e4a55cfb39558450ae14bc50 SHA-256: 8a73fd0694a71dc6e9713eb84dd4c216a9eadc2540bb86866eb4c3b66a7d92c7

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability, including RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics. These indicate the file is designed to trigger an OLE object activation, likely leading to the execution of embedded malicious code. The presence of OLE object data further supports this. No specific family could be identified, and no IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000018f2.bin` `46251c6c34fac8b809f35f3775eb6a750da7c35bc578a5f6a0b6ee51a531cb90`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x18F2	2254 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.