Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a6714500ea32d83…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 6e017759ed35a0ed89b9a6dbafe11ec1 SHA-1: 00e2b6e61e48c9557bd0491ab0600a4e73db801a SHA-256: 8a6714500ea32d83246ffdb734b7a895de273916a684a3592d4c7b2a771da9ab
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor to achieve code execution. The ".DOC" file type further supports this, as RTF is often used as a delivery mechanism for such exploits.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ce.bin
eecaed3f2e5f1d59ec09ec0039ed7a84a72f07c8aab07ae654fef2b12948b2c4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCE 1666 bytes