Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a5bba96adc806e7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

170.0 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 56db191570f1740edb271e13723280d0 SHA-1: 48a6cedc50abed857d71251b780b4039bebd419b SHA-256: 8a5bba96adc806e7810f7d68faca9fbda2908802640252d6ee1accb545785ae3
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass

The OLE document exhibits a large slack space and an appended executable payload, indicating it's a container for malicious code. The 'OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED' heuristic suggests that VBA macros could not be extracted, but the presence of appended payload bytes is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The file's SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 174,080 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 157,537 bytes (90%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.

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