Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a5943fa7c496a55…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.09 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: ffef6d3fcfaa918cb4cf2975b0e6cbaa SHA-1: 189e4b396ce60b0aea71987135cbb5da2b93bd52 SHA-256: 8a5943fa7c496a55942fd90e20118c26a0f257a25490a25169937b26ddcb9df5
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1204 User Execution

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, which allows for OLE activation and arbitrary code execution. The embedded URL, while benign, is part of the document structure related to the exploit. The primary attack vector is likely spearphishing, leading to user execution of the malicious RTF file.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0010be28.bin
840c12a0f28eb8167178a49b7ca6199302639b8f8fa84c5cd47369a42f9e55c5		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10BE28 3669 bytes

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