Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a5664b254e758c6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.6 KB Created: 2021-07-28 00:55:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: a05a94c6bf41370e84f5605eb2c3d73f SHA-1: 0777751e53689d392f7d18a5e7ccd228d097400f SHA-256: 8a5664b254e758c64caac9c7d5c8ce95129b25e7f94fe1c638e860e8370eed19
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF was flagged by a machine learning classifier and ClamAV as malicious, exhibiting characteristics of a social engineering attack (ClickFix). The document likely aims to deceive the user into executing a command, potentially to download and run a secondary payload. Numerous URLs were found, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories, suggesting a distribution mechanism for malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9969

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.yourhealthyourchoice.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bfed86b156a---57800645866.pdf
    • http://positiveforce.in/uploads/files/48860653421.pdf
    • https://atolab.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a568c72c5a1511046669808363f73ec0/jogugozujatama.pdf
    • https://www.aserspa.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ppmgfc1l2hm65pgjri88ar8uju/pusokokisixubekuzinamukad.pdf
    • http://akcjonariusz.com/UserFiles/file/dijovoxamifu.pdf
    • https://advantagelic.com/singhania/downloads/file/71225371122.pdf
    • http://netcentricnj.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gogetog.pdf
    • https://lastcallslc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a8d44931cbfb6bf93c7ad1062598d2a1/biduwijepakisufuzapiba.pdf
    • https://lisacutler.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16097bdab16b90---nanolaliropunolebaxib.pdf
    • https://xn--bren-mgenwil-gcbf.ch/sites/default/files/fck-uploads/file/88105046886.pdf
    • http://www.siposferenc.hu/html/58581409286.pdf
    • https://www.nobleorthodontic.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0d982eecd3e555db1f40a02ed7e0f19e/nelow.pdf
    • http://royalwedding.jp/images/blog//file/89817161206.pdf
    • http://wypelnienia.kratex.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/088e27349d2095e70a85f9923c3f1794/93633026069.pdf
    • https://nuregio.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c25619eccc2---52838574744.pdf
    • http://baschin-heizung.com/meineBilderAlbertGrundschule/file/29629838192.pdf
    • http://saxons99.com/clients/5/5f/5faa49e4155ddd0d4faf97b0d7aa3dde/File/potapumevoregisod.pdf
    • http://ciskmv.com/css/file/51402619886.pdf
    • https://milsagliksen.org/upload/ckfinder/files/texojo.pdf
    • https://x-software.cz/data/file/kedaxulutizilajimof.pdf
    • http://www.sunarozlem.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dmll2246rcpt1vc5pck4o7s140/13482774345.pdf
    • https://www.medicalart.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082fbfe3aeb2---kizuzu.pdf
    • https://www.capitalroofingct.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f943d5eb9f9---levarabatefiziro.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+chromecast+pictures+to+tv+from+laptop
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001128f.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1128F 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012aa6.bin
b900ad6b0c2893cdfba3a584d16f06be6177da8fbfd83ed34017a245328dd0fa
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12AA6 10884 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000143dd.bin
d99a77375c605fc5f769d9b8837f1368ab499b8ef42675fcc08d9e85150eb26b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x143DD 17196 bytes