Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a5317c372f567f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.7 KB Created: 2020-08-08 15:09:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 3ef8d91f77bc7f2b73505207e3751960 SHA-1: 30e6fdf58fe2eff9001fe778535bf8d7c9d42be6 SHA-256: 8a5317c372f567f653cad0ce80289c9ecd242ad38291a224ef20d14fa9ee366b
294 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains an embedded script payload and links to a known malicious redirector. The document body also contains instructions to copy and paste content into a shell, indicating a social engineering lure to execute malicious code. The embedded script is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload from the provided URL.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=azure+cli+cheat+sheet+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.holtzeducationalcenter.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382673/likax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ptwmassage.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163635/marizero-vasipes-rasilujeru-dugigelirur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kellyhowardglass.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379540/durureda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/27247465441.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5442/3464/files/84016243234.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6694/0828/files/boundaries_in_dating_henry_cloud_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0279/7986/files/jamey_aebersold_maiden_voyage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5358/0437/files/36326194900.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1907/4716/files/american_sign_language_alphabet_chart.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1778/8830/files/xinibotafupodipuvepiluzu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/1819/7912/files/93916556051.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4673/9868/files/72975764055.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5851/1510/files/91183768873.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9901/2763/files/4123197443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2966/6724/files/dungeons_and_dragons_manual_del_jugador_5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5809/4495/files/23097528876.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1610/1798/files/cabinet_mission_plan_in_urdu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0000c9d8.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0xC9D8 1612 bytes
SHA-256: 075732853bbb43dfc5c252f98557daacba08e010fc216fe37c375857da68cd6c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Smallpdf Desktop'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Nacazuno Yiyusunu</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Azure cli cheat sheet pdf. I&#39;m pretty sure you know how reliable Windows PowerShell&#39;s support for Microsoft Azure is. With Azur</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Azure cli cheat sheet pdf. I&#39;m pretty sure you know how reliable Windows PowerShell&#39;s support for Microsoft Azure is. With Azur</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Azure cli cheat sheet pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-02-28T21:56:41'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='81b48012-ee60-46fc-b242-8c7a667f9f6d'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='36bc20eb-bb47-4c6c-8155-b1957fca69f2'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off00006c72.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C72 5284 bytes
SHA-256: e9e729f51f1231ada26ad2b0648b8e5f4b2d93d74d70ffce94fa4a42a4d1c1e3
font_01_sfnt_off00007e6d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7E6D 14196 bytes
SHA-256: 434f916d7d6457d1ba30e6db77ccf400e35c87a6299c0244ba765ad2a629c55d
font_02_sfnt_off0000ac06.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAC06 16312 bytes
SHA-256: 975089639afea594160f6daa1ae948ffc4125994d61a9fd32dce02580f7b6b15

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