Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a3cec9b8afa04d0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.5 KB
MD5: 54026c4583be0e83d750502a4bc4fc37 SHA-1: 0848273b565026d3fb5d918ebc3932d46260e302 SHA-256: 8a3cec9b8afa04d0beade7db643e2dfc98c103d80599172715fac9003eb984b7
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJAUTLINK heuristics strongly indicates an exploit leveraging CVE-2017-11882 or a similar vulnerability within the Equation Editor. This exploit likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload, although no specific scripts or URLs were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000093.bin
8c40bcb3c7ba049a6355386561432c8a3fe5bed8289124d5ceaa57eb777f037b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x93 1572 bytes