Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a3b529fcd0232f7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.7 KB Created: 2021-09-22 22:30:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 73873e0546f766d0c5bfb2c363ae5bb7 SHA-1: 333deee73dfaedbbcc42b52a29891f8780097ba1 SHA-256: 8a3b529fcd0232f7cfc82eb51c76e9ab01c17eca35b1b3e775713845f5f91b67
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

This PDF document contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external URLs, indicating it is designed to trick users into performing malicious actions. The document body and embedded script content suggest a lure related to Office 365 password changes, and the presence of callback lures indicates a phishing or tech-support scam. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the execution of further malicious code or redirection to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9953

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://laborke.ru/uplcv?utm_term=user+must+change+password+at+next+logon+office+365 PDF link annotation
    • http://ciarajewellery.com/editor_upload/file/jezeletinumajufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://coniperfumes.cl/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/50101815918.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rsentco.com/upload/file/mifidazanedotura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://osullivanspressurewashing.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161361297ba171---72727078116.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shastriratanchatterjee.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/35970418067.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bhavanarayanaswamy.org/userfiles/file/54001997765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://microfocus-realize2020mea.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aeb70d3b822532d6e29ea7e2f3c0b906/dapimoxuwibova.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://taispacedesign.com/upload/files/95518311123.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://atputasbaze.lv/images/userfiles/files/naxatomobukudazajoxis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://seamacros.com/upload/file/12078877681.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://skulpt.in/admin/uploads/file/zotobowenidorup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jeyadhurgatemple.com/userfiles/file/wesijomebomasuzopuzodu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bokseinstituttet.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16130f22c5f03f---fisogoxaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shopinhome.com/ci/userfiles/files/61036181482.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://giaexploring.it/userfiles/files/5345957543.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://waetsukai.jp/system/ckfinder/userfiles/files/34588691210.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smartickgroup.com/userfiles/xojidezidegovarapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--12cmi2byac9cdhd0hra6d7bxkwbgj1gch.com/user_img/files/navasorejubalisaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.tunnel.de/files/uploaded/file/57436923414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rmissio.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614a0823e5165---vepuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rasathantrananotech.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vukefetuzujarojeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cermak-expo.cz/data/files/file/sirugij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://martonelektro.hu/files/file/37533914775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001319d.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1319D 1731 bytes
SHA-256: 373f95028978d5292bbf64a18f55a63e85e845df39a56a1a2c7ef1b3efd89e8d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='PDF Studio'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Saweluli Xixofoxa</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>User must change password at next logon office 365. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;User must change password at next logon office 365 powershell. &lt;/h2&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>User must change password at next logon office 365. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;User must change password at next logon office 365 powershell. &lt;/h2&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>User must change password at next logon office 365</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-04-15T00:46:35'
  xmp:CreatorTool='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='5d9a8179-41b0-4b27-9bf1-dbd4a4e5b9f9'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='03e38030-8854-4105-91b0-726386cc088f'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000c817.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC817 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000e029.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE029 17132 bytes
SHA-256: 8752f6aeacd60be6e0da7664de60a400a322102aed627d548465b47e272d3d5f
font_02_sfnt_off00010d02.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10D02 11836 bytes
SHA-256: 20f772f7475f190701091aef40911d0dd49ccfb3905ee9f6d99217f310d00c65

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